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The World is Flat: Modeling Educators’ Misconduct with Cellular Automata 
 
 
Misconduct in education is a serious problem internationally. As the education sector 
grows, so does the scale of misconduct. The large bureaucratic apparatus, overregulation, 
outdated and unclear rules, and poor audit create opportunities for abuse. The blending of public 
sector, private firms, and personal interests of educators and education bureaucrats leads to 
collusion and evolvement of different forms of misconduct, especially widespread in large 
university systems and school districts. Corruption and other forms of misconduct may be 
modeled in large educational organizations with strong vertical and horizontal ties with the help 
of cellular automata. This paper offers a theoretical framework and a methodology based on 
cellular automata to study corruption in large educational organizations, including school 
districts and state university systems. The presented methodology is based on cellular automata. 
In the essence of cellular automata are different programming characteristics designed to predict 
future misconduct. Starting with different cases or combinations of behavior on the workplace 
and working environment as initial conditions, the process of cellular automation simulates 
behavior of educators and results in images that depict likely future developments in educators’ 
misconduct within educational and bureaucratic organizations. Applicability of the offered 
methodology and its value is in modeling, simulation, and control. 
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Introduction 
Misconduct in education is a serious problem internationally. As the education sector 
grows, so does the scale of misconduct. The large bureaucratic apparatus, overregulation, 
outdated and unclear rules, and poor audit create opportunities for abuse. The blending of public 
sector, private firms, and personal interests of educators and education bureaucrats leads to 
collusion and evolvement of different forms of misconduct, especially widespread in large 
university systems and school districts. 
Educators’ misconduct is not limited to embezzlement of the state funds by educational 
bureaucrats or collecting bribes from students by faculty members. Misconduct in education goes 
far beyond that and may be found in secondary and higher education sectors, in public and 
private sectors, in centralized and decentralized educational systems. It manifests itself in forms 
of bribery, embezzlement, extortion, fraud, nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, kickbacks, 
transgressing rules and regulations, bypass of criteria in selection and promotion, ghost teachers, 
cheating, plagiarism, research misconduct, data falsification, discrimination, and abuse of public 
property. In most of the instances corruption in education has a systemic character and hence can 
be modeled. 
Cellular automaton offers a promising methodology to study misconduct in education. It 
allows making forecasts, assessments, and predictions on the scope and scale of corruption 
within organizations. Cellular automata, used in sciences, may be applied to investigate 
corruption in large hierarchical structures of educational organizations. This paper offers a 
theoretical framework and a methodology based on cellular automata to study corruption in large 
educational organizations, including school districts and state university systems. 
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The problem of misconduct in education 
Misconduct in education includes misconduct that arises from university-business 
relations, academic misconduct, cheating, plagiarism, and other forms of fraud, misconduct in 
relations of professors and students including sexual misconduct, research misconduct, private 
tutoring that involves conflict of interest, bribery in admissions and grading, embezzlement of 
public funds and funds of private universities, abuse of public property, gross waste, and 
mismanagement of university property. All of these forms of misconduct were given 
consideration in numerous scholarly publications. Education misconduct can be found 
throughout the world, including developed nations, transition economies, and developing 
countries. 
Major grounds for misconduct and corruption include the size of the system, amount of 
funds employed, intensity of monetary transactions, and complexity of the system. New York 
City, the largest school system in the country, has over 1.1 million students, a budget of over $14 
billion, over 1,200 schools, and 140,000 employees. Los Angeles is the second largest, with 
three-quarters of a million pupils, a $7 billion budget, 900 schools, and 80,000 employees. 
Chicago, the third largest, has half a million students, a $3.5 billion budget, 600 schools, and 
45,000 employees. The operating budgets of the New York City and Chicago districts are each 
larger than the entire amount most states invest in education. Corruption in education is 
significant and includes bribery, fraud, gross waste, embezzlement, nepotism, cronyism, 
favoritism, and other forms of misconduct (Segal, 2004). 
Segal suggests estimating corruption, waste, and abuse on the basis of intensity by raising 
the following question: “Are they opportunistic and occasional or systemic and chronic?” (Segal, 
2004) Referring to Ermann and Lundman (1978), Segal admits that some sporadic, opportunistic 
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fraud and waste is almost inevitable in any large organization, while noting that systemic 
patterns suggest a deeper, constitutional problem: “What is striking about the New York City, 
Los Angeles, and pre-1997 Chicago school districts is how systemic and persistent corruption, 
waste, and abuse have been in certain non-core areas. The intensity of the problem is such that… 
investigators unearthed the same kinds of schemes year after year, sometimes for decades.” 
(Segal, 2004, p. 19) Corruption and lack of civic responsibility compromise the quality of 
schooling. Neither community involvement nor parental committees are helpful in restoring 
quality education. The literature on misconduct in education points to at least three important 
characteristics that are of interest for this study: the large size of educational systems and 
organizations where misconduct occurs, the systemic character of misconduct, and the role of 
peer pressure and oversight in preventing or perpetuating misconduct. 
 
Literature review 
Different theoretical frameworks are applied to study different forms of misconduct in 
large organizations. Lui (1986) considers dynamic models of corruption and inclusion of 
deterrence as a factor for reducing corruption or confining it within the certain limits. Carillo 
(2000, p. 3) points to possible collusion between supervisors and agents: “corruption can 
propagate within the hierarchy. We capture this recursive property of corruption by assuming 
that agents can share the bribe with their superiors in exchange for not being denounced.” The 
issue of collusion is addressed in Gong (2002), Khalil and Lawarree (1993, 1995, 1996), Laffont 
and Martimort (1997), Lambert-Mogiliansky (1995), Olsen and Torsvik (1998), Strausz (1996), 
and Tirole (1986). These works examine collusion-proof contracts in different settings of the 
principal-agent frame. 
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Principal-agent theory, first developed in economics to study relations between the 
owners of the enterprises and their managers, is used to investigate corruption. The principal-
agent problem in the fields of public policy and economics is described by Banfield (1975), 
Becker and Stigler (1974), Darden (2002), Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2001), Rose-
Ackerman (1975, 1978, 1999), and Solnick (1998). Principals and agents are both self-interested 
actors, so their preferences often diverge. This agency problem not only urges a principal to 
monitor the agent, but also to try different mechanisms of controlling the agent’s behavior. 
Referring to Klitgaard (1988, p. 23), Gong states that corruption “occurs when an agent betrays 
the principal’s interests in pursuit of his/her own or when the client corrupts the agent if he or she 
(client) perceives that the likely net benefits from doing so outweigh the likely net costs.” (Gong, 
2003, p. 88) Describing collective corruption, Gong says that its purpose is “to maximize 
individual gains and/or minimize the risks associated with corrupt activities.” (Gong, 2003, p. 
88) 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993), and Ahlin (2001) investigate possible implications of 
centralization and decentralization of corrupt organizations on the total volume of corruption. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) consider vertical structures and conclude that decentralization of 
corruption leads to an increase in the total volume of graft collected by corrupt bureaucrats. 
Ahlin (2001) comes to the similar conclusion in his research on horizontal structures and 
regional distribution of corruption and. Corruption in hierarchies is researched by Bac (1996, 
1998, 2001), Olsen and Torsvik (1998), and Varian (1990) in connection with the principal-agent 
theory. Olsen and Torsvik (1998) consider collusion in organizations within the principal-agent 
frame. Guriev (2001) investigates three-tier hierarchies with principal, bureaucrat, and agents. 
Carillo (2000) develops a four-tier hierarchical model that includes corrupt behavior. Waite and 
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Allen (2003) follow the possible top-down and bottom-up channels of conveying benefits of 
corruption as well as resources in educational systems. 
Cost-benefit analysis is used in designing cost-effective models and mechanisms of 
supervision. Bac (1998) investigates the problem of organizing three agents in a hierarchical 
monitoring structure and designing a corresponding incentive system to minimize the cost of 
implementing a target level of corruption. Bac (1996, 1998) combines hierarchies, cost-benefit 
analysis, and collusion in potentially corrupt structures and demonstrates that the possibility of 
collusion may prevent the implementation of anything less than full corruption. He asserts, “In 
relatively flat hierarchies, economies of scale in monitoring reduce implementation costs but 
may increase the risk of collusion.” (Bac, 1998, p. 110) Different types of hierarchies include the 
hierarchy where one supervisor monitors two subordinates within the supervision chain, which is 
shown to display in its upper part a higher risk of collusion than in its lower part. Different 
hierarchical structures are then contrasted with each other in order to follow the performance of 
each in terms of better supervision and control. Lately, methodologies normally used in sciences 
find their way in research of corruption, including primarily its economic aspects (Shao et al., 
2007; Blanchard et al., 2005). 
 
Theoretical framework 
As denoted by Wirl (1998, p. 203) based on works of Wolfram (1986, 1994), a cellular 
automaton is an iterating map F that updates at each period t the value or action of a site i, 
denoted a(t), depending on the neighbors actions in period (t-1) from a fixed radius r into the set 
of possible states, which is discrete and of dimension k, {0,1,2,…,k-1}: 
a t F a t a t a ti i r i r i r( ) ( ( ), ( ),..., ( )).= − − −− − + +1 11 1  
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In deterministic cellular automata, the new state of a cell is determined on the basis of its 
actual state and states present in the neighboring cells. In the simplest case, a one-dimensional 
cellular automaton anticipates two possible states and a neighborhood of three cells. With two 
possible states and the neighborhood of three there are eight possible combinations of initial 
conditions and outcomes for the cell in focus. In a two-dimensional cellular automaton, cells can 
be positioned in hexagonal or square configurations. In a Von Neuman neighborhood, cells are 
influenced by their neighbors from four sides, while in a Moore neighborhood diagonal links are 
also involved. Hence, a Von Neuman neighborhood consists of five cells, including the cell in 
focus, and a Moore neighborhood consists of nine cells. Stochastic or three-dimensional cellular 
automata are more complex forms than one- and two-dimensional models. In stochastic models, 
the transition rule allows for stochastic or probabilistic distribution. In such case the model can 
indicate the next state of the cell in focus based on the probability of its changing its initial state 
or preserving it. Stochastic cellular automaton reflects on spatial inter-specific competition of 
neighboring cells for the determination of the focus’ cell next stage. 
Ideally, any large bureaucracy or professional organization, including those with complex 
hierarchical structures, can be decomposed to a simple linear one-period system. The resulting 
abstraction can be processed with cellular automata based on the set rules of functions. In some 
instances initial randomly distributed cells of types a and b can evolve into a homogenous state 
at a certain stage. In other cases, evolution will lead to a set of infinite separated simple stable or 
periodic structures depicting different combinations of cells a and b. As applied to employees’ 
behavior in complex organizations, the initial chaotic patterns of behavior can transform into 
periodic patterns, homogenous state, or chaotic unorganized patterns indistinguishable from the 
initial patterns. Periodic patterns reflect repetitive behavior of employees. Evolution leads to 
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emergence of complex localized structures. In this case, some very complex spatial patterns may 
arise and reproduce over long periods of time. Such patterns may also exhibit intriguing spatial 
propagation despite a perfect conservation of their shape. Thus, surprisingly complex behaviors 
can arise from the action of randomly distributed cells with distinct patterns of behavior and 
result in locally concentrated processes that are not strategically directed but rather sporadic. 
 
Methodology 
In the simplest case, a cellular automaton consists of a line of cells or, as in our case, 
education bureaucrats, with each cell carrying a value of zero or one. The site values evolve 
synchronously in discrete time steps according to the values of their nearest neighbors to indicate 
the effect of peer pressure and moral constraints. The analysis involves initial determination of 
educators who do and do not commit misconduct. The next step is to determine the period, or the 
single step, along the timeline. For instance, for educational financiers the period might be one 
financial year, while for teachers it might be one week or one academic year. The third step 
involves programming, or setting the rules according to which cellular automation is to progress. 
The rules include determinants of peer pressure and anticipated economic benefits from 
corruption. Further developments of the given methodology are in the two-dimensional cellular 
automata that can produce patterns with complicated boundaries (Packard and Wolfram, 1985). 
Cellular automata are based on iterated functions. The process of iteration, i.e. a repetitive 
process, allows for an infinite number of equal steps. 
 
Model 
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This paper offers the following theoretical model for application of cellular automata to 
misconduct in education sector and more specifically to corrupt educators. It considers educators 
as rational actors that calculate their expected cost and benefit of being involved in misconduct 
and make decisions about whether to participate in corrupt activities based on net benefits. It is 
assumed that net benefit from accepting a bribe or committing other possible forms of 
misconduct is a function of the benefits of corruption, including the size of a bribe or , the risk of 
being exposed and prosecuted, and the social pressure from colleagues as well as personal ethics, 
Q = f(E,C,S). 
Models of corruption presented in economic and political science literature normally do 
not account for social environment and personal characteristics of educators. Specifically, 
rationalistic approaches to corruption formalized in such models do not give consideration to 
such factors as influence of the educator’s colleagues, their interactions, and moral and ethical 
beliefs of the educator. The environment in which corruption is to take place as well as the 
educator’s personal views on corruption will be denoted as social pressure. The task is to 
operationalize social pressure and include it in the consideration of corrupt behavior and 
decision-making regarding the support of the system. We will incorporate social pressure into the 
initial model of corruption and compliance with the formal and informal rules that exist in the 
system and simulate the educator’s behavior with the help of numerical examples. 
Social pressure includes peer pressure on the educator and his moral considerations. It is 
assumed that in corrupt organizations peer pressure works toward encouraging corruption. 
Higher peer pressure results in a higher probability for the educator to accept bribes and to 
comply with the current system. His moral considerations, however, can work in the opposite 
direction. Contrary to peer pressure, the educator’s morality negatively impacts his willingness to 
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accept bribes. Net social pressure is calculated by subtracting the numerical value of moral 
considerations from the numerical value of peer pressure. The model of decision-making based 
on the net benefits the educator i would expect from corruption is presented in the equation 
below: 
 
Q E p m d ri t i t i t i t t t, , , ,( ) (− − − − −= + − )−− ×1 1 1 1 1 1 ,                                                   (1) 
 
where i denotes the educator, E is the economic benefit from being involved in 
corruption, d is the degree of punishment defined by law for a corrupt educator, r is the 
probability of being exposed, C is the total cost of being corrupt, p is the peer pressure, m is the 
moral considerations, S is the net social pressure, Q is the net benefit from corruption. All 
variables are taken in the period t-1. If Q<0, then the educator will decide not to support the 
current system. If Q>0, then the educator will decide to support the current system. 
Opportunity costs of working in the education sector for period t-1 can be equal to the 
educator’s present salary, benefits of corruption, social pressure, and risks, associated with 
bribery and other forms of corruption. In this case the educator is neutral to the existing system. 
He/she neither supports the system, nor is he/she willing to change it because his/her position in 
terms of income and personal wealth will likely stay unchanged. The equality can be presented 
as follows: 
 
Oi,t-1 = + + − − ×− − − − − −L E p m d ri t i t i t i t t t, , , ,( ) (1 1 1 1 1 )1                                          (2) 
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If O<0, then the educator will decide not to support the current system. If O>0, then the 
educator will decide to support the system. Peer pressure is understood as a pressure of corrupt 
colleagues on the educator toward corruption. Such a pressure may come from other educators 
within the department and the administration. Accordingly, the value of p is anticipated to 
always be positive. The state pressure on corrupt educators is exogenous and hence is not 
included in the initial model. The educator’s moral standards are assumed to be against 
corruption, and hence m is negative. A numerical example of defining the educator’s decision of 
whether to support the system in exchange for the opportunities to collect bribes or commit 
misconduct without being punished is presented in Table 1. 
 
Model simulation 
Table 1 provides a numerical example for the extended model presented above (2) for the 
period t-1. The assumption is made that social pressure depends on two educators who are the 
nearest colleagues of the educator whose decision is at stake. The educator’s colleagues are 
denoted in the table as i-1 and i+1. Let us assume that the social pressure function takes the 
values 0 for deviating from the colleagues’ behavior, 1 for conforming to one of the two 
colleagues, and 2 for a uniform corrupt behavior of all three educators. The values are obtained 
as results from the combination of peer pressure and moral considerations. Peer pressure is equal 
to 2 if both of the educator’s colleagues are corrupt, 1 if only one of colleagues is corrupt, and 0 
if both of colleagues do not accept bribes. Moral considerations are assigned values of 0 or 1, 
depending on whether the educator already accepts bribes. 
The degree of punishment for corrupt behavior is uniform for all of the possible 
combinations of corrupt and uncorrupt educators and has a value of 4. The probability of being 
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exposed depends on the corruptness of the colleagues-educators. If the educator is not corrupt, 
the probability of being exposed is equal to 0 only if both of his colleagues are corrupt. However, 
if the educator will accept a bribe while having both of his colleagues not involved in corrupt 
activities, the probability of being exposed is equal to 1. Having only one of two colleagues 
corrupt makes the probability of being exposed equal to 0.5. Accordingly, the value of the total 
cost of being corrupt varies from 0 to 2. The value of present or legal salary of the educator i is 
constant for all three periods, t-1, t, and t+1, uniform, and equal to 2. The fair market salary or 
the opportunity costs of the educator i is also constant for all the three periods, t-1, t, and t+1, 
uniform, and equal to 3. 
The value of the economic benefits from corruption is equal to 2. It is uniform for all the 
possible combinations. It is assumed that bribes are collected over a certain period of time. This 
period of time is similar to the one over which the corrupt educator bears the risk of being 
exposed and prosecuted. As can bee seen from the numerical example, the degree of punishment 
is twice as high as the expected benefits from corruption. This encourages corrupt educators to 
seek safe harbors, such as highly corrupt environments. A good example of a safe harbor would 
be a department where most or all of the educators are corrupt. 
Let us now assume that the authorities have lowered the degree of punishment that a 
corrupt educator may face if accused of corruption and prosecuted. We lower the existing level 
of punishment of 4 down to 2. A numerical example of defining the educator’s decision of 
whether to support the existing system in exchange for the opportunities to collect benefits of 
corruption without being punished is presented in Table 3. 
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Table 1 
 
A numerical example of defining the educational employee’s decision of whether to support the system, based on such considerations, 
as total benefit, costs, and social pressure, (period t-1) 
 
Education 
employee 
Econom
ic 
benefits 
from 
corrupti
on, E 
Costs of corruption, risk Social pressure Net 
benefits, 
Q 
Present 
legal 
salary, L 
Opport
unity 
costs, 
O 
Decision 
(whether 
to support 
the 
existing 
system), 
D 
i-1 i i+1 Degree 
of 
punishm
ent, d 
Probabil
ity of 
being 
exposed, 
r 
Total 
costs, 
C 
Peer 
pressure, 
p 
Moral 
consider
ations, 
m 
Net 
social 
pressu
re, S 
yes yes yes 2 4 0 0 2 0 2 4 2 3 Yes 
yes yes no 2 4 0.5 2 1 0 1 1 2 3 No 
yes no yes 2 4 0 0 2 1 1 3 2 3 Yes 
yes no no 2 4 0.5 2 1 1 0 0 2 3 No 
no yes yes 2 4 0.5 2 1 0 1 1 2 3 No* 
no yes no 2 4 1 4 0 0 0 -2 2 3 No 
no no yes 2 4 0.5 2 1 1 0 0 2 3 No 
no no no 2 4 1 4 0 1 -1 -3 2 3 No 
* In one case in the numerical example the opportunity costs of the educator i are equal to the sum of his present salary, 
benefits derived from corruption, and risks that arise due to being involved in corrupt activities. Ideally, this would mean that the 
education employee who faces the choice of either supporting the current system or otherwise, is indifferent or neutral. The moral 
values are already given consideration in the example. However, as far as the educator’s decision is concerned, it is marked as “No,” 
meaning that the educator will likely decide not to support the system. This can be explained by some other external factors that are 
likely not to be in favor of supporting the system that allows corruption. Let us also explain it by some minimal transaction costs that 
might be incurred by the educator in order to accept bribes, embezzle, and extracts other benefits from corruption. 
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Table 2 
 
A numerical example of defining the educational employee’s decision of whether to support the system, based on such considerations, 
as total benefit, costs, and social pressure, (period t) 
 
Education 
employee 
Econom
ic 
benefits 
from 
corrupti
on, E 
Costs of corruption, risk Social pressure Net 
benefits, 
Q 
Present 
legal 
salary, L 
Opport
unity 
costs, 
O 
Decision 
(whether 
to support 
the 
existing 
system), 
D 
i-1 i i+1 Degree 
of 
punishm
ent, d 
Probabil
ity of 
being 
exposed, 
r 
Total 
costs, 
C 
Peer 
pressure, 
p 
Moral 
consider
ations, 
m 
Net 
social 
pressu
re, S 
yes yes yes 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 4 2 3 Yes 
yes yes no 2 2 0.5 1 1 0 1 2 2 3 Yes 
yes no yes 2 2 0 0 2 1 1 3 2 3 Yes 
yes no no 2 2 0.5 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 No* 
no yes yes 2 2 0.5 1 1 0 1 2 2 3 Yes 
no yes no 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 3 No 
no no yes 2 2 0.5 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 No 
no no no 2 2 1 2 0 1 -1 -1 2 3 No 
*Similar to the period t-1, in one case in the numerical example in the period t the opportunity costs of the educator i are equal 
to the sum of his present salary, benefits derived from corruption, and risks that arise due to being involved in corrupt activities. 
Accordingly, as we did in Table 1, we assume that the educator is in opposition to the existing system. 
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Table 3 
 
A numerical example of defining the educational employee’s decision of whether to support the system, based on such considerations, 
as total benefit, costs, and social pressure, (period t+1) 
 
Education 
employee 
Econom
ic 
benefits 
from 
corrupti
on, E 
Costs of corruption, risk Social pressure Net 
benefits, 
Q 
Present 
legal 
salary, L 
Opport
unity 
costs, 
O 
Decision 
(whether 
to support 
the 
existing 
system), 
D 
i-1 i i+1 Degree 
of 
punishm
ent, d 
Probabil
ity of 
being 
exposed, 
r 
Total 
costs, 
C 
Peer 
pressure, 
p 
Moral 
consider
ations, 
m 
Net 
social 
pressu
re, S 
yes yes yes 2 1 0 0 2 0 2 4 2 3 Yes 
yes yes no 2 1 0.5 0.5 1 0 1 2.5 2 3 Yes 
yes no yes 2 1 0 0 2 1 1 3 2 3 Yes 
yes no no 2 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0 1.5 2 3 Yes 
no yes yes 2 1 0.5 0.5 1 0 1 2.5 2 3 Yes 
no yes no 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 2 3 No* 
no no yes 2 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0 1.5 2 3 Yes 
no no no 2 1 1 2 0 1 -1 0 2 3 No 
*Similar to periods t-1 and t, in one case in the numerical example in the period t+1 the opportunity costs of the educator i are 
equal to the sum of his present salary, benefits derived from corruption, and risks that arise due to being involved in corrupt activities. 
Accordingly, as we did in Tables 1 and 2, we assume that the educator is in opposition to the existing system. 
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As can be seen from Table 3, the number of cases when the educator will choose to 
comply with the system increased 100 percentage points, from 2 to 4. Hence, a voluntary 
reduction of the degree of punishment from 4 in period t-1 down to 2 in period t leads to a 
significant increase in the number of cases in which the educator will support the system. 
Despite the significant increase in the number of cases when the educator will support the 
existing system in period t, it constitutes only half of all possible cases. This is not sufficient for 
the system that wants to sustain itself. The system can not afford an increase in the salaries it 
pays to college professors due to budget constraints. Nor can it facilitate an increase in the total 
sum of benefits educators generate from corruption. The size of bribes and the total scale and 
scope of bribery and other forms of corruption in education, as well as in other sectors of the 
economy, are mostly determined by the market forces, including consumer demand and clientele 
base, not by the state. 
Further proliferation of the corruption and compliance policy is needed. Therefore, as 
follows from equations (1) and (2), the authorities are interested in the reduction of the total cost 
of being involved in corruption for each educator. This can be done easily since the punishment 
mechanism is administered by the state. While the state can not regulate the risk of exposure r, it 
can regulate the degree of punishment d. The degree of punishment consists of the probability of 
being prosecuted and sentenced and the level of punishment chosen by the state in regard to the 
corrupt educator. While formally the degree of punishment may be high, the actual degree of 
punishment d may be relatively low, based on the low rate of prosecution. Furthermore, 
prosecution itself is a threat only for those who choose not to comply with the authorities’ 
demands. 
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Let us assume that the authorities have lowered the degree of punishment that a corrupt 
educator may face if accused of corruption and prosecuted. We reduce the existing level of 
punishment of 2 in period t down to 1 in period t+1. A numerical example of defining the 
educator’s decision of whether to support the system in exchange for the opportunities to collect 
bribes without being punished is presented in Table 3. The number of cases when the educator 
will chose to comply with the system’s demands increased 50 percentage points, from 4 to 6. 
Hence, a further voluntary reduction of the degree of punishment from 2 in period t-1 down to 1 
lead to a significant increase in the number of cases in which the educator will opt for supporting 
the system. Probability of being exposed may be a function of peer pressure. Accordingly, an 
increase in peer pressure may lead to a decrease in the probability of being exposed and, hence, 
to a further decrease in the total cost of being involved in corrupt activities. This will lead to an 
even higher probability of the educator being in support of the existing system. 
 
Results 
The results of cellular automation simulation, including those obtained after analyzing the 
large educational organizations, are best seen as graphic depictions. They might be simple yet 
reliable assessments of the future developments that reflect the scale and the scope of educational 
misconduct. Wirl says that “Although cellular automata are very simple, deterministic machines 
and thus crude approximations of real, economic situations, they are capable of describing self 
organization and complex patterns (of corruption).” (Wirl, 1998, p.199) The images, both black 
and white and in color, depending upon the initial characteristics of the cells and the authors’ 
determination, allow for visual examination of future patterns of misconduct. The structures with 
the clear aisles or sporadic distribution of corrupt educators point toward particular educators 
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who are likely to commit misconduct in the future. Most interestingly, the predictions point to 
those members of large organizations who are most likely to be involved in misconduct after a 
certain period of time and yet who at the present may even be unaware of this. 
We present three simulations based on distinct functions of deterministic patterns of 
behavior. The images appear structuralistic in nature, with dispersed triangles of different sizes, 
often localized in groups, with diffused and randomly distributed single cells. In all of the images 
generated below, black color identifies a corrupt educator, while white color identifies a non-
corrupt educator. Two neighbors, one on the left and one on the right, influence their neighbor in 
the middle. We focus on the educator in the middle. For each function, we use 1000 educators in 
a one-year, i.e. 365-day period, where each cell represents a given educator in a given day. 
We present three functions. Each of the functions reflects a certain balance of powers and 
combination of factors, including central authorities, educators, pay rates, risk of exposure, 
degree of punishment, and peer pressure. Based on the significance of these initial factors in each 
of the three cases, we formulate certain dependencies expressed as functions 1, 2, and 3. 
Function 1. (Rule 18). Let us assume that: 1. three corrupt educators grouped together 
cause the authorities to initiate an investigation; accordingly, the risk of punishment for being 
involved in misconduct increases, and as a result the educator refuses to participate in corruption. 
Hence, having two corrupt neighbors in period t-1 causes the educator to become non-corrupt in 
period t; 2. having one non-corrupt neighbor causes the corrupt educator to become non-corrupt 
in period t, if he was corrupt in period t-1; 3. having two corrupt educators-neighbors causes the 
educator to remain non-corrupt in period t, because he/she reasonably expects that his/her 
neighbors will remain corrupt in period t and that three corrupt educators will cause the 
authorities to initiate an investigation. The risk will go up and the educator will have to refuse 
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corruption; 4. having two non-corrupt neighbors causes the corrupt educator to become non-
corrupt, since peer pressure in this case pushes him/her toward non-corruption. In addition, the 
risk of being exposed by non-corrupt peers is higher; 5. finally, having two non-corrupt 
neighbors in period t-1 causes the non-corrupt educator to remain non-corrupt in period t. The 
results of cellular automaton for the function 2 are presented in figures 1 through 4. 
 
 
Figure 1. Function 1. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, with 
corrupt educators being distributed randomly in day one 
 
Figure 2. Function 1. Randomly selected magnified textural structure 
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Figure 3. Function 1. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, with 
one corrupt educator initially in day one 
 
Figure 4. Function 1. Randomly selected magnified textural structure 
 
Function 2. (Rule 126). Let us assume that: 1. three corrupt educators grouped together 
cause the authorities to initiate an investigation; accordingly, the risk of punishment for being 
involved in misconduct increases, and as a result the educator refuses to participate in corruption. 
Hence, having two corrupt neighbors in period t-1 causes the educator to become non-corrupt in 
period t; 2. having one corrupt neighbor allows the corrupt educator to remain corrupt in period t, 
if he was corrupt in period t-1; 3. having one corrupt neighbor in period t-1 encourages the non-
corrupt educator to become corrupt in period t; 4. having two corrupt educators-neighbors in 
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period t-1 allows non-corrupt educator to become corrupt in period t; 5. having two non-corrupt 
neighbors allows the corrupt educator to remain corrupt, since peer pressure in this case is 
weaker and does not push him/her toward non-corruption. In addition, the risk of being exposed 
by non-corrupt peers is lower. 6. finally, having two non-corrupt neighbors in period t-1 causes 
the non-corrupt educator to remain non-corrupt in period t. The results of cellular automaton for 
the function 2 are presented in figures 5 through 8. 
 
 
Figure 5. Function 2. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, with 
corrupt educators being distributed randomly in day one 
 
Figure 6. Function 2. Randomly selected magnified textural structure 
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Figure 7. Function 1. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, with 
one corrupt educator initially in day one 
 
 
Figure 8. Function 2. Randomly selected magnified textural structure 
 
Function 3. (Rule 86). Let us assume that: 1. three corrupt educators grouped together 
cause the authorities to initiate an investigation; accordingly, the risk of punishment for being 
involved in misconduct increases, and as a result the educator refuses to participate in corruption. 
Hence, having two corrupt neighbors in period t-1 causes the educator to become non-corrupt in 
period t; 2. having one corrupt neighbor causes the corrupt educator to remain corrupt in period t; 
3. having one corrupt neighbor causes the non-corrupt educator to become corrupt in period t; 4. 
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having two corrupt educators-neighbors in period t-1 causes the educator to remain non-corrupt 
in period t, because he/she reasonably expects that his/her neighbors will remain corrupt in 
period t and that three corrupt educators will cause the authorities to initiate an investigation; 5. 
having two non-corrupt neighbors allows the corrupt educator to remain corrupt, since peer 
pressure in this case is weak and does not push him/her to become non-corrupt; 6. finally, having 
two non-corrupt neighbors in period t-1 causes the non-corrupt educator to remain non-corrupt in 
period t. The results of cellular automaton for the function 3 are presented in figures 9 through 12. 
 
 
Figure 9. Function 3. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, with 
corrupt educators being distributed randomly in day one 
 
Figure 10. Function 3. Randomly selected magnified textural structure 
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Figure 11. Function 3. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, with 
one corrupt educator initially in day one 
 
Figure 12. Function 3. Randomly selected magnified textural structure 
 
Functions 1, 2, and 3, depicted on the images, do not necessarily correspond with the 
numerical examples we offered earlier. But in the essence, lesser peer pressure to be non-corrupt 
and the risks associated with participation in corrupt activities become definitive in educators’ 
behavior in both numerical simulations and graphic representations. According to Function 1, the 
educator is unlikely to be encouraged to participate in misconduct in most of the instances. As a 
result, the structure of the cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, with 
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corrupt educators being distributed randomly in day one and with one corrupt educator initially 
in day one, depicted in figures 1 and 3, respectively, is of a lesser density than that of Function 2. 
Cellular automaton based on Function 2 appears to have somewhat similar structure, but is 
clearly denser. This means that higher peer pressure to become corrupt and lesser risk of 
prosecution make the number of instances of having corrupt educators is much higher. 
Finally, as depicted in figure 9, cellular automaton based on Function 3 is less chaotic 
and has a more structured appearance, than do cellular automata based on Functions 1 and 2. 
Figure 11 presents a quite astonishing pattern of distribution of educators’ misconduct that starts 
from a single corrupt educator in day 1 and by the end of the year there are already a few 
hundred corrupt educators with a perspective of further proliferation until the margins are 
reached. The triangle that reflects the area of misconduct spread in the educational organization 
has a much higher density than the pyramidal structures in figures 3 and 7. Equally interesting is 
that there is a clearly visible asymmetry in the way the cellular automaton progression is 
structured. The right side of the triangle and its center is structured along horizontal and vertical 
lines, while the left side of the equation is grouped more along the diagonal lines directed from 
the center parallel to the left lateral position. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The presence of corruption in the education sector throughout the world is obvious; it is 
presented in scholarly work and is proven based on legal cases, surveys, interviews, and 
numerous publications in the media. Corruption in many national education systems has a 
systemic character, is endemic to the society, and often reaches epidemic proportions. Access to 
education, academic grades, term papers, degrees, credentials, and honors are all for sale. 
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Educators of all ranks in many countries are grossly underpaid along with other public 
employees. They abuse their position in order to sustain themselves. Chronic underfunding, poor 
coordination, lack of transparency and control result in an education system riddled with all 
types of misconduct, from outright bribery and kickbacks to cronyism and ghost teachers, and 
from grand scale embezzlement and fraud to gross waste and petty theft. 
This paper presents cellular automation, a relatively new methodology to study 
misconduct in large educational organizations, and uses simulation to model the behavior of 
educators, including factors that influence their decision making. This methodology may be used 
beneficially for future research in organizations and corrupt hierarchies, including school 
districts and higher education institutions and make valid and credible forecasts. 
Cellular automaton may prove to be a more effective and cost-efficient methodology than 
estimation of systems of partial differential equations. Research of corruption with the use of 
cellular automata is virtually nonexistent. Wirl (1998) presents basic socio-economic typologies 
of bureaucratic corruption and their implications as studied through the application of cellular 
automata. Computational organization theory is presented in works of Carley and Prietula (1994), 
Carley and Gasser (1999), as well as in the journal of Computational & Mathematical 
Organization Theory. Some of the aspects of organizational corrupt structures may be studied 
along the lines of computational organization theory which uses computational and mathematical 
methods to study organizations, formulates models, and develops tools and procedures to 
validate organizational models. Eventually, this methodology will be used to improve 
educational organizations through an increase in their organizational effectiveness and efficiency 
and a reduction and future prevention of misconduct. 
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Cellular automaton is not universal, as any other methodology. Nevertheless, cellular 
automaton based simulations can be used to model a wide variety of different environments and 
patterns of development, from corrupt practices among faculty in Tbilisi State University in the 
country of Georgia to education policy adoption strategies of states in the US, and from distinct 
modes of research misconduct in large research universities and think tanks to opportunistic 
behavior of education bureaucrats and school teachers in large public school districts. 
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